Introduction
In many developed countries, health care expenditures have increased more rapidly than GDP in the last decades. The sources of this increase in health care expenditures are manifold. First, technical progress in medicine allows to cure formerly incurable illnesses and to reduce mortality but also increases total costs of the health care system. Second, the demographic change in Germany already led to an ageing population which, on average, results in a higher demand for medical services and products. Since contribution rates to social health insurance in Germany are linked to salaries, health care costs that increase more than salaries lead to higher contribution rates and, thus, to a higher burden for both employees and employers.
Furthermore, constantly high unemployment in Germany, which might be partly a result of high contribution rates, reduces revenues of the social health insurance companies adding further pressure on the contribution rates.
Against this background, the German government initiated five major health care reforms in the 1990s to stop contribution rates from further rising. Despite these efforts average contribution rates increased from 13.2% in 1995 to 14. Compared to North America, the evidence on the effects of copayments on the usage of the health care system in Germany is rather small. The main reasons for this lack of evidence is that copayments for the utilization of the health care system have been introduced rather late if compared to the US or Canada. Until 2004, only copayments for prescription drugs have been part of the German health care system. Winkelmann (2004) uses the German health care reform of 1997 to examine the impact of copayments for prescription drugs, which have been increased by up to 200% through this reform, on doctor visits. Using a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effects of this reform, his results indicate that this policy measure decreased the number of doctor visits by about 15%.
Similar to Winkelmann (2004) , this paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effects of the introduction of copayments for doctor visits.
The next section describes the health reform of 2004 in more detail. Section 3 presents the data and our identification strategy. The empirical results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The German health reform 2004
In Germany, the social health insurance finances roughly 58% of the total health expenditures of 240 billion euros (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit 2005). Basically, social health insurance is mandatory for all employed workers. Yet, when the salary exceeds a certain threshold, a person can choose whether to remain in the social health insurance system or to opt out and alternatively acquire private health insurance. Independently of their salary, civil servants and self-employed can always choose between social and private health insurance.
The social health insurers calculate income-dependent premiums, so called contribution rates, that do not correspond to individual risks. The payments of the insured are equal to salaries times the contribution rate, up to an income ceiling.
Almost half of the premium is paid by employers; the rest is paid by the employee.
Roughly 250 health insurers compete with each other on the basis of the contribution rate (Tamm, Tauchmann, Wasem, and Gress 2006 are a few health insurers that exempt their insured from the fee if they participate in certain health programs. Children and teenagers until the age of 18 are exempted from the fee. In addition, persons covered by private health insurance do not pay the fee because they do not belong to the social health system. Thus, youths and privately insured were not affected by the reform and might serve as a valid control group when evaluating the effect of the fee on doctor visits.
Given the changes of the reform of 2004, we expect that the probability to visit a doctor within a quarter decreases for adults covered by social health insurance.
Yet, even though the total number of doctor visits should decrease, the number of doctor visits of a person within a quarter should not be affected conditional on having visited a doctor at least once in the quarter. It is unclear whether the effect is larger or smaller for persons with low income. On the one hand, the probability to visit a doctor might decrease more for persons with a low income, because the fee of 10 euros is relatively expensive for them. On the other hand, their reaction might be weaker than average because total health expenditures are capped by 2% of gross income.
Data and methodology
To investigate the effects of the copayments introduced in 2004 on the probability of visting a doctor, we employ data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP).
The GSOEP is an annual representative survey of individuals aged 16 and above which started in 1984. All individuals aged at least 17 years at the time of the interview were asked if and how often they have visited a doctor in the last three months. In most cases, however, the interviews for the GSOEP take place in the first three months of each year. Therefore, the reported number of doctor visits We rely on a difference-in-differences approach to identify the causal effect of the introduction of copayments on doctor visits. The outcome variable is defined as a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the individual has visited a doctor in the last three months and 0 otherwise. Note that this variable perfectly reflects the incentives introduced by the copayments. After the introduction of the copayments individuals have an incentive to avoid doctor visits in a particular quarter of the year. Once they have visited a doctor in a quarter, additional doctor visits are not subject to the copayment anymore, i.e. conditional on having visited a doctor in a quarter the copayment should have no effect on further doctor visits.
In our empirical analysis, the treatment group includes all individuals covered by statutory health insurance except youths younger than 18. 14,519 observations fall into this group. We use two different kinds of the control groups. The first control group consists of all individuals covered by private health insurance who are at least 18 years old. 1,786 observations fall into this group. Based on this control group we specify the following fixed effects logit model
where Y it is the outcome variable for individual i at time t as defined above. X it is a vector of time-variant covariates including household net income, marital status, employment status, number of children aged 6 or younger, hours worked per week, and highest educational achievement. D it is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for observations in the year 2005 and 0 otherwise, and C it is the treatment indicator taking the value 1 for adults covered by statutory health insurance and 0 for adults 6 covered by private health insurance. Finally, α i is an individual fixed effect that captures time invariant individual heterogeneity, ε it is the stochastic error term.
The estimate of δ 1 is the difference-in-difference estimator.
The second control group consists of 168 youths aged 17. In this case, we can not employ the panel structure of the data set anymore because the control group is time-variant due to its age restriction. Instead, we pool the data and specify the following logit model
In this model, the DiD estimator is given by δ 2 . As a specification check of model (2), we restrict the treatment group to only 18 and 19 year old adults because they are more comparable to the control group of youths aged 17 than the whole group of adults.
The key identification assumption of the DiD approach is that the parameters δ 1 in model (1) and δ 2 in model (2) are zero in the absence of the policy change.
This implies that the interaction term must be uncorrelated with the error term.
In other words, as the model only includes common time effects captured by the dummy variable D, it has to be assumed that conditional on the covariates X there are no unobserved time-varying determinants of the outcome variables with a differential effect on the treatment and control group. This assumption rules out, for example, that changes in the macroeconomic environment display different effects on the two groups or that there are other policy changes that affect the two groups differently. This assumption also rules out that persons covered by social health insurance change the way they count the number of doctor visits because of the reform. If this was the case our estimates would be biased towards zero.
Another substantial part of the German health care reform of 2004 was the increase of copayments on prescription drugs. Similar to the copayments on doctor visits these copayments concern only patients of the social health insurance and might strengthen the effect of the copayments on doctor visits (Winkelmann 2004 A second problem for our identification strategy may occur if the individuals modify their behavior in terms of doctor visits in anticipation of the reform. Our outcome variable is measured one year before the introduction of the copayments. At this point in time, the copayments have not been discussed by German politicians.
Even if so, there would hardly have been any incentive to change behavior already at this point in time. Therefore, the problem of anticipation effects (Ashenfelter 1978) should not be of importance for our empirical analysis.
Results
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the probability to visit a doctor for the three specifications of the control group providing an unconditional difference-indifferences estimate of the treatment effect. The table shows that persons covered by the social insurance system have a significantly higher probability to visit a doctor when compared to persons covered by private health insurance. In addition, adults show a significant higher probability to visit a doctor than youths at the age 17.
No significant differences appear between adults younger than 20 and youths at age 17. Over time, the probability to visit a doctor does not change significantly for neither group. These differences imply positive unconditional DiD-estimates of the treatment effect for all three specifications of the control group. In all cases, however, the unconditional DiD-estimates are not statistically significant. Different to the unconditional DiD-estimates reported in Table 3 , the conditional DiD coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the copayments indeed reduced the probability to visit a doctor. However, the estimated DiD coefficient becomes positive and insignificant as soon as we control for individual heterogeneity by estimating a fixed-effect logit model (see column 3 of Table 4 ). A similar result appears when using the alternative definitions of the treatment and control group. No matter whether we compare adults covered by social health insurance with individuals younger than 18 or adults aged 18 or 19 three months before the interview with youths, the DiD-coefficient appears to be positiv and insignificant (columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 ). Table 5 displays the results when we allow for heterogenous treatment effects by analyzing different subgroups: men, women, West-Germans, East-Germans, individuals of different education levels, and household income groups, respectively.
Throughout Table 5 we are using persons covered by private health insurance as control group. Not controlling for individual heterogeneity we find significant and negative coefficients for the subgroup of West-Germans, individuals with a university degree, and -at a significance level of 10% -in the lowest income quartile. Note, however, that all estimated treatment effects become insignificant when controlling for individual heterogeneity by estimating a fixed-effect-Logit model.
Conclusion
Using the German Socioeconomic Panel we investigated the impact of the introduction of a copayment of 10 euros for doctor visits on the probability to visit a doctor. Since youths and persons covered by private health insurance do not have to pay these copayments it is possible to use two different control groups in a difference-in-differences approach. Our empirical results suggest that the introduction of the copayment did not have a significant effect on the probability of visiting a doctor.Nor for different subgroups of gender, region, education, and income can significant effects be measured if individual heterogeneity is controlled for.
These findings are in contrast to the public opinion and the descriptive statistics stating that the health care reform resulted in a decrease of cases of medical treatment for family doctors as well as medical specialists. This difference might be explained partly by the fact that after the reform patients avoid doctor visits if they only want to collect a prescription by clustering all possible visits to one date and by using bigger package sizes of prescribed drugs. Conditional on any doctor visit within a quarter, however, the number of visits does not alter. 
